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Abstract 
 
 
 
This paper uses new data on agricultural policy interventions to examine the political economy 
of agricultural trade policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Historically, African governments have 
discriminated against agricultural producers in general (relative to producers in non-agricultural 
sectors), and against producers of export agriculture in particular. While more moderate in recent 
years, these patterns of discrimination persist. They do so even though farmers comprise a 
political majority.  Rather than claiming the existence of a single best approach to the analysis of 
policy choice, we explore the impact of three factors: institutions, regional inequality, and tax 
revenuegeneration. We find that agricultural taxation increases with the rural population share in 
the absence of electoral party competition; yet, the existence of party competition turns the 
lobbying disadvantage of the rural majority into political advantage. We also find that privileged 
cash crop regions are particular targets for redistributive taxation, unless the country's president 
comes from that region. In addition, governments of resource-rich countries, while continuing to 
tax export producers, reduce their taxation of food consumers. 
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This chapter explores the political economy of agricultural trade protection in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. It makes use of a new World Bank dataset of indicators of distortions to domestic prices 
of agricultural (and non-agricultural) commodities caused by government policies – trade taxes, 
non-tariff trade barriers, subsidies,  or currency distortions.
1 When greater than zero, the 
indicators suggest that government policies favor farming; when the relative rate of assistance is 
below zero, it suggests policies have an anti-agricultural bias.  
As indicated in chapter 2, governments in Africa, like those elsewhere, have adopted less 
distorting/more neutral policies since the 1980s. Increasingly their policies impact farming and 
other industries in a less biased manner. However, policies in Africa continue to alter prices in 
ways that discriminate against farming, and more so than in other developing country regions.  
In this chapter we describe the levels of protection in our sample of 20 Sub-Saharan 
African countries
2 and the manner in which they vary; and, drawing from the literature on the 
political economy of agriculture, we advance and test a series of explanations for the patterns we 
observe. 
                                                 
1 Anderson and Valenzuela 2008), based on a methodology outlined in Anderson et al. (2008). See the Annex for 
specific definitions of these indicators. 
2 The Sub-Saharan African countries in the sample are Benin (C), Burkina Faso (L), Cameroon (R,C), Chad (L), 
Cote d’Ivoire (C), Ethiopia (C,L), Ghana (C), Kenya (C), Madagascar (C), Mali (L), Mozambique (C), Nigeria 
(R,C), Senegal (C), South Africa (R,C), Sudan (L), Tanzania (C), Togo (C), Uganda (L), Zambia (R,L), and 
Zimbabwe (L). These countries account for no less than 90 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population, GDP, farm 
households and agricultural output. “C” indicates coastal; “L” indicates landlocked, and “R” indicates resource-rich.  
Note that for five of these countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Togo) the data refer only to cotton. We 
include these countries only in our analyses of agricultural exportables and tradables.  
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Pertinent features of Africa 
 
 
 
Agricultural policies in Africa vary substantially across the continent. In their recent study of 
Africa’s economic performance in its first fifty years of independence, Ndulu et al. (2007) stress 
the importance of differentiating between countries whose economies are resource rich,
3 
landlocked, or coastal. These three different groups of economies behave as if possessing 
different production functions, they argue, and attempts to account for Africa’s growth 
performance gain in explanatory power when taking this heterogeneity into account. The policies 
vary over time as well. 
Figure 1 portrays  the rate of protection of importable as opposed to exportable 
commodities, with negative numbers indicating a bias in favor of import-competing crops and 
thus against agricultural trade. This bias reached a low point around 1980 and then subsequently 
lessened during the period of market-oriented reforms (the 1980s and 1990s). In recent years, 
those in landlocked countries have tended to exhibit the least bias against agricultural trade while 
those in coastal states tend to exhibit the greatest.  
The data in figure 2 suggest that Africa’s governments (with the exception of those in 
landlocked countries) have tended to protect food crops, raising the level of domestic prices 
above those prevailing in world markets, while taxing cash crops. The distortions introduced by 
government policies have eroded over time, with nominal rates of assistance for cash crops 
converging toward zero. Within the region, governments of resource rich countries tend to 
provide the most favorable policy environment for producers of both food and cash crops,
4 while 
the governments of landlocked countries tended to impose the least.  
                                                 
3 A country is classified as resource-rich if (i) starting in the initial year, current rents from energy, minerals and 
forests exceed 5 percent of Gross National Income (GNI); (ii) a forward-moving average of these rents exceeds 10 
percent of GNI; and  (iii) the share of primary commodities  in exports exceeds 20 percent for at least a 5-year 
period following the initial year. 
4  However, resource rich countries still maintained a negative level of nominal assistance toward cash crops. See 
the Annex for details on the calculation of rates of assistance to food versus cash crops. 
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Figure 3 illustrates the relative rates of policy support for agriculture versus non-
agriculture (RRA, the relative rate of assistance to tradables), demonstrating that the bias against 
agriculture has abated since the 1980s, but nonetheless remains. Here, too, the geographic 
distinctions are quite clear: governments in all three types of the countries discriminate against 
agriculture, but those in landlocked countries consistently discriminate the most while those that 
govern countries that are resource rich discriminate the least and governments in coastal 
economies consistently fall between these two extremes. 
Figure 4 jointly summarizes the movement of these indicators. Constructed for each 
decade since the 1970s, the sequence of charts trace changes at the country level. Cells to the left 
of zero on the horizontal axis (TBI) reflect an anti-agricultural trade bias, while cells below zero 
on the vertical axis (RRA) reflect an anti-agriculture bias in sectoral policies.  
The charts reveal that in the 1970s, nearly every country in the sample implemented 
policies that were both anti-agriculture and anti-trade.
5 The dispersion of trade bias was 
relatively greater than the dispersion of relative rates of assistance to agricultural as opposed to 
non-agricultural commodities. Over time, however, the country averages tended to converge, 
with the degree of convergence in trade bias exceeding that in the bias against agriculture. 
Despite these changes, no countries emerged as both pro-agriculture and pro-agricultural trade 
by the end of the sample period. Indeed, most remained in the cell that captures biases against 
both agriculture and agricultural trade.  
In the sections that follow, we seek to explain these patterns. 
 
 
Explaining policy choices in Africa: theoretical considerations 
 
 
In accounting for variation in agricultural policies, researchers tend to focus on the level of 
development, as signified by the degree of structural transformation and corresponding 
differences in the level of per capita income (Kuznets 1966; Chenery and Taylor 1968). When 
doing so, many highlight the paradoxical position of agriculture in the political economy of 
                                                 
5  Exceptions include Kenya, which adopted policies favoring agricultural trade, and Nigeria, which maintained a 
slightly pro-agriculture stance until the current decade. 
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development: when agriculture composes the single largest sector of the economy and farmers 
the single largest category in the labor force, then governments tend to manipulate prices in ways 
that lower the incomes of farmers; when, however, agriculture forms but a small portion of the 
GDP and farming a miniscule portion of the labor force, then governments tend to adopt policies 
that favor the fortunes of farmers. As we commonly assume that political power tends to derive 
from income and numbers, the relationship between the level of development and the nature of 
government policy therefore poses a paradox – one that is fundamental in the political economy 
of development.  
To begin to unravel this paradox, most turn to Engel’s law, which holds that for a given 
rate of increase in consumer income, there will be a less than proportionate rate of increase in the 
portion of income spent on food. The empirical relationship between average income and the 
size of the agricultural sector conforms to this regularity. And so too would the reversal in 
government policy: when people are poor and spend a large portion of their incomes on food, 
they demand that governments protect their interests by adopting policies that lower the costs of 
food; as incomes improve and food forms a smaller portion of the consumption bundle, however, 
pressures for governments to lower food prices would tend to decline (Bates and Rogerson 1980; 
Anderson, Hayami and Others 1986; Lindert 1991). 
Our sample is drawn from the lower portion of the global distribution of income and, as 
seen in the Annex, the within-sample variance is low. Our sample set of countries could 
therefore be expected to exhibit a common preference for policies that favor the interests of 
consumers. As we have seen, however, variation around this common tendency remains. By 
controlling the impact of per capita income, as it were, our data thus afford us the opportunity to 
explore the relationship between policy choice and factors left out of the standard account.  
Our arguments 
 
One source of differences is variation ininstitutions. As changes in institutions mark the course 
of the recent history of Africa, they help to account for variations in policies over time. 
Differences in natural endowments constitute a second source of variation, with some being 
richly endowed and others not and many containing both rich regions and poor. Not being time 
varying, differences in these characteristics help to account for cross-country differences in 
agricultural policies. They do so, we argue, by influencing the politics of redistribution and 
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revenue extraction, both of which shape the choice of public policies, particularly toward cash 
crops for export.  
 
Political institutions 
 
By lobbying or voting, citizens affect the policy choices of governments. The voting size of the 
rural sector affects the way in which farmers can employ these channels. 
 
Lobbying  
When the rural population constitutes a large percentage of the national population, then 
agricultural production tends to lie in the hands of a large number of small producers, dispersed 
throughout the countryside. As no single producer can influence government policy, and as 
organizing so large and diverse a population is costly, the individuals’ incentive to lobby is 
weak. In countries with large agricultural populations, agriculture should therefore constitute an 
ineffective interest group. In addition, when the portion of the population in agriculture is large, 
that which is urban is small. The number of non-rural consumers would then tend to be small and 
they would be spatially concentrated.  
 
Consumers should therefore hold a relative advantage as lobbyists in countries with large 
agricultural populations. And we therefore expect governments in countries with large 
agricultural sectors to adopt relatively adverse policies toward farming (Olson 1965, Bates 1981, 
Anderson 1995). 
 
Voting   
However, the very factors – size and dispersal – that render farmers weak lobbyists can render 
them powerful in electoral settings (Varshney 1995, Bates 2007a,b). Where representation is 
achieved through electoral channels, and where rural dwellers constitute a large segment of the 
voting population, then politicians encounter powerful incentives to cater to the interests of 
farmers. In environments with electoral competition, politicians encounter electoral incentives 
that would impel them to resist the political pressures emanating from urban consumers. 
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Figure 5 captures the nature of political institutions in Africa. The 7-level scale depicted 
in this figure (described below) demonstrates the striking shift towards political competition over 
time. The index increases with the extent of electoral party competition (with level 7 being the 
most competitive). In the 1970s, over 80 percent of country-year observations fell at or below 
level 3 on this scale. In contrast, by 2000-2005, over 90 percent of observations were at level 6 
or greater.  
In the sections that follow, we present statistical evidence relating the governments’ 
choice of policy to (a) the size of the rural sector, as measured by the share of the population that 
dwells in rural areas, and (b) to the nature of political institutions and in particular to the 
presence or absence of party competition in the selection of the head of state.  
 
Regional redistribution 
 
As noted by Ndulu and O'Connell (2007), a larger portion of Africa’s economies are based on 
the extraction of natural resources than is the case in other regions of the world. One result is 
geographic inequality, arising from differences in natural endowments. While in advanced 
industrial societies the politics of inequality takes the form of class conflict, in Africa it often 
assumes the form of conflict between regions.  
Roughly 80 percent of Africa’s economies possess within-country regions that appear 
significantly more prosperous than others,
6 and in roughly two-thirds of those cases these 
relatively prosperous regions include producers of cash crops. Examples include the coffee 
industry in the relatively wealthy Central Province of Kenya, or the cocoa industry in the rich 
central districts of Ghana. Such regions may offer targets for those seeking resources to 
distribute to the poorer portions of the nation.  
The impact of pressures for regional income redistribution depends, however, on the 
regional distribution of power. In places such as Kenya, where the long-serving head of state, 
Jomo Kenyatta, was from the agriculturally productive Central Province, he marshaled the power 
of the national government to defend the province’s interests and resisted efforts to tax export 
agriculture (Bates 1989). In contrast, the political leadership in neighboring Tanzania came from 
the poor, semi-arid zones of the country, and employed the power of the state to tax regions, such 
                                                 
6 See, for example, the data gathered by Nordhaus (2006). 
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as Kilimanjaro, made wealthy from the production of cash crops. Policies toward cash crops thus 
depend not only on regional differences in income but also on the regional allocation of power.  
 
The revenue imperative 
 
For many nations in Africa, agriculture constitutes the largest portion of the economy and 
agricultural commodities figure prominently among the goods traded. And for most African 
countries, trade taxes constitute the single largest source of public revenue. Insofar as 
governments seek to raise revenues, they are therefore likely to tax agriculture. Only when other 
major sources of revenue – such as mineral or petroleum deposits – are available could one 
expect governments to deviate from this pattern. Governments endowed with ample revenue, 
moreover, are better able to fund programs that would enable them to lower food prices for 
consumers. We should therefore expect them to attempt to a greater degree than others to adopt 
policies designed to lower the domestic price of food crops. 
 
Summary 
 
Based on the preceding discussion, our expectations therefore are that:   
•  agricultural taxation will decrease with declines in the rural population share; 
•  electoral competition will mitigate the negative effects of rural population share; 
•  the presence of an economically privileged region, all else being equal, will reduce 
support (increase taxation) for cash crops,  
o  but the presence of a president from the privileged region will mitigate these 
effects; and 
•  resource-rich countries will impose less taxation on producers of agricultural exportables 
and simultaneously will impose less taxation on consumers of agricultural importables 
relative to those in international markets.  
 
Explaining policy choices in Africa: regression results 
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This section tests these hypotheses, using both parametric and non-parametric methods. Of 
central interest are the correlates of the relative rates of assistance for agriculture versus non-
agriculture (RRA) and the nominal rates of assistance for agricultural importables and 
exportables (Table 1-3). Each table reports four sets of estimates, two (in columns 1 and 2) 
drawn from OLS models (with and without an interaction between rural population share and 
electoral competition); one drawn from a random effects model (column 3); and the last drawn 
from a system GMM model (column 4). The models include several control variables: per capita 
income (in logs), the extent of arable land, and the geographical situation of the country, with 
coastal location serving as the reference category.  
Before commenting on the tests of our hypotheses, we first note the coefficients on the 
control variables. Those in table 1 and 2 confirm the absence of a relationship between the 
measure of per capita income, relative rates of assistance, and nominal rates of assistance for 
importables (most of which are food). In table 3, by contrast, the coefficient on income is 
positive and significant in all models, indicating that, as will be discussed, the political economy 
of export crops differs from that of food crops. Consistent with figure 3, the regressions in table 
1 indicate that landlocked countries substantially favor the interests of other sectors over those of 
agriculture. In addition, we find (in table 2) that resource rich countries tend to lower the 
domestic price of importables, i.e. food, by comparison with the policy stance assumed in coastal 
economies. Viewing the share of land that is arable as a proxy for the overall importance of 
farming, the results in Tables 1 and 2 also suggest that the policy orientation of governments 
towards agriculture does indeed vary positively with the magnitude of this measure.  
 
Rural population share and political institutions   
 
We have argued that collective action on the part of farmers is more difficult the greater their 
numbers, but that electoral competition transforms numbers into a political advantage. We thus 
expect government policies toward agriculture to be more adverse to the interests of producers 
the greater is the rural dwellers’ share of the population, with this effect being conditional on the 
nature of the party system.  
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As an indicator of the country’s party system, we employ a measure contrived by Ferree 
and Singh (2002) and subsequently amended and adopted by the World Bank for its Database of 
Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001, 2008). The indicator (the Executive Index of Electoral 
Competitiveness, or EIEC) measures the level of competition that occurs during the executive 
selection process. To a greater degree than other measures (i.e., Gastil’s political and civil 
liberties indices), the EIEC is based on observable characteristics rather than subjective 
judgments. Unlike the Polity measures, moreover, it is invertible: given a score, an observer 
gains precise information regarding the political system. The indicator consists of seven levels as 
follows: 
Level 1 -- No executive exists 
Level 2 -- Executive exists but was not elected 
Level 3 -- Executive is elected, but was the sole candidate 
Level 4 -- Executive is elected, and multiple candidates competed for the office 
Level 5 -- Multiple parties were also able to contest the executive elections 
Level 6 -- Candidates from more than one party competed in executive elections, but the 
President won more than 75 percent of the vote 
Level 7 -- Candidates from more than one party competed in executive elections, but the 
President won less than 75 percent of the vote. 
We deem a party system competitive when the EIEC score is greater than 6. Note that we 
omit all consideration of the “quality” of electoral competition, including whether elections have 
been deemed “free and fair.”   
As can be seen in the Annex, the mean share of the rural population in our sample is 
approximately 70 percent. The value of EIEC exceeded 6 in approximately 38 percent of 
country/year observations.  
 
Estimation strategy 
Our generic specification is: 
(1)  it i it it it it X e Rurpopshar Elecomp e Rurpopshar Elecomp y ε ν β γ γ γ α + + + + + + = ) * ( 3 2 1  
where yit is one of our key policy indicators for country i in year t, Rurpopshare is the share of a 
country’s population living in rural areas, X is a vector of the control variables from our baseline 
specification, and νi captures unobserved time-invariant country-specific effects. The interaction 
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term in equation (1) requires that we evaluate a linear combination of coefficients (γ1+γ3 * 
Rurpopshare) in order to assess the impact of electoral competition (which we will evaluate at 
low and high levels of rural population share), and (γ2+γ3) to assess the impact of rural 
population share when the electoral system is competitive. In selected cases, we also present 
semi-parametric results for key explanatory variables. For each left-hand side indicator we begin 
by excluding the interaction term from equation (1) while still allowing the measures of rural 
population and electoral competition to enter separately.  
In order to assess the robustness of our estimates, we employ a series of estimators to 
analyze this specification. We begin by employing OLS, initially constraining 0 3 = γ , then 
including the interaction term in our fully-specified model.
7 We then exploit the panel structure 
of our data by employing two additional estimators. Most of the identifying variation lies in the 
cross-sectional dimension of the data: the “within” standard deviation in rural population share in 
our sample is only 3.6, as compared with the “between” variation of 10.7, relative to the mean of 
70.6. As the fixed-effects estimator depends solely on within-country variation, we therefore 
employ a random effects estimator, a choice supported by the Hausman test. Lastly, given the 
tendency for hysteresis in policy choice, we also employ the system GMM dynamic panel 
estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998). Use of the GMM estimator helps to alleviate concerns 
with endogeneity that might arise were rural population shares and the adoption of competitive 
electoral systems may depend on factors that influence the dependent variable as well, and that 
had been excluded from the model.  
 
Relative Rate of Assistance 
Table 1 presents our results for RRA. As expected, the point estimate for the impact of rural 
population share in the absence of electoral competition is negative in all models, and positive in 
the presence of electoral competition, although in no case is it statistically different from zero.. 
Adding the interaction term permits a more nuanced analysis of the “shift” effect of party 
competition: at high levels of rural population share (85 percent, as compared with 50 percent),
8 
in the OLS and RE models, electoral competition bears a positive and significant relationship 
with policy choices that favor the agricultural sector. While the coefficient for the GMM 
                                                 
7 All OLS estimates use robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the country level. 
8 Recall that the sample mean is roughly 75 percent. 
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estimate does not significantly differ from 0, it is greater than the effect of party competition on 
policy choice at low levels of rural population share by a margin of 23 percent (P = 0.024), based 
on the GMM estimate.
9 
  To probe these relationships more deeply, we relax that assumption of linearity and 
estimate semi-parametric (or “partially-linear”) models of the form: 
(2)   i i i i e Rurpopshar g X y ε β + + = ) ( 
where X includes all of the variables included above except for the rural population share, and 
g(.) is an unknown function relating the dependent variable to rural population share. We 
estimate this remaining non-parametric relationship for the sub-samples with and without 
electoral competitiveness. 
Figure 6 displays the semi-parametric relationship between RRA and rural population 
share while controlling for electoral competition. In the absence of competitive elections, relative 
assistance to agriculture declines rapidly as the rural population share increases above the sample 
mean. Competitive electoral systems appear to check the negative impact of larger rural 
populations.  
 
Nominal Rate of Assistance to agricultural importables and exportables 
Consistent with our hypotheses, we find in Table 2 that trade policy support for agricultural 
importables – largely consisting of food crops -- declines as a function of rural population share. 
When the dummy variable for party competition enters without the interaction term (controlling 
for average rural population share in column 1), it increases the nominal rate of assistance for 
agricultural importables by nearly 20 percent. When interacted directly with rural population 
share, the results reveal that the effect of electoral competition on nominal protection for 
agricultural importables depends critically on the level of rural population share. While not 
statistically different from zero at relatively low levels of rural population share, we find that 
electoral competition transforms high values of rural population share from a political liability 
into a political asset. At a high level of rural population share (85 percent), the estimates indicate 
                                                 
9 The bottom rows of each table describe “total effects.” The total effect of rural population share with competitive 
elections (e.g., the partial derivative of the regression with respect to rural population share) asks whether the slope 
coefficient of rural population changes when there is party competition. Conversely, the total effect of party 
competition (e.g., the partial derivative of the regression with respect to party competition) asks whether the shift 
effect of party competition varies with the rural population share. 
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a substantial and statistically significant benefit from electoral competition in all three models. 
Figure 7(a) captures graphically the relationship, while relaxing the assumption of linearity of the 
functional form.  
Table 3 suggests that rural population share bears no relationship with the level of 
nominal protection of agricultural exportables. As seen at the bottom of that table, at high levels 
of rural population share producers of agricultural exportables do benefit from electoral 
competition, but the impact is small and of little significance. Figure 7(b) confirms the first 
finding, that nominal assistance for agricultural exportables in the absence of competitive 
elections is not a function of rural population share, while suggesting that party competition can 
reduce the burdens based on agriculture when the rural share of the population is high.  
In important respects, then, the findings for importables and exportables differ, which 
suggests that the political forces that shape government policies toward them differ as well. It is 
our argument, further elaborated in the following sub-section, that the politics of cash crops is 
shaped by the forces of regionalism and revenue extraction to a greater degree than are the 
politics of food crops.  
 
Regional inequality and presidential origin  
 
Data collected by the authors indicate that most African states contain rich regions and poor, and 
that in roughly 70 percent of the instances in which the country is marked by regional inequality 
the region is prosperous in part because of the production of cash crops. Particularly in the case 
of cash crops, then, we would expect the politics of agricultural policy to be shaped by the 
politics of regional inequality, as poor regions seek to extract resources from rich, while rich 
regions seek to defend against their efforts. 
To illustrate, consider the historic rivalries between the socialist systems of Tanzania and 
Ghana on the one hand and the “capitalist” systems of Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire on the other 
(Barkan (1994). In Tanzania, President Julius Nyerere drew his political support from the cities 
and the semi-arid lowlands; in Ghana, President Kwame Nkrumah drew his from the cities and 
the semi-arid north. Both seized a major portion of the revenues generated by the export of cash 
crops – coffee and cocoa, respectively – in order to finance projects designed to benefit their 
constituencies. In their neighboring states of Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire, by contrast, the 
     13
Presidents’ political constituencies lay in the richer regions. In Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta’s 
constituency was the heartland of the coffee industry; in Cote d’Ivoire, Houphouet Boigny’s lay 
within the cocoa zone. Rather than endorsing regional equality, Jomo Kenyatta and Houphouet 
Boigny employed the power of the state to defend the fortunes of their wealthy regions from 
those championing the fortunes of less well endowed.
10 
The intuition imparted by these cases informs the models reported in table 4. Our 
estimating equation in this case is similar to equation (1), but with the focus now on dummy 
variables indicating the existence of a privileged cash crop-producing region and indicating 
presidential origin from a privileged region: 
(3) it i it it it it it X origin pres cashreg origin pres cashregion y ε ν β γ γ γ α + + + + + + = ) _ * ( _ 3 2 1  
where X includes all variables from the previous specifications. 
  In columns 1 and 2 of table 4, the dependent variable is an indicator of relative policy 
support for cash versus food crops; positive values indicate relatively greater support for cash 
crops and negative values indicate a bias against cash crops in favor of food crops.
11 Both 
coefficients are negative, although only the first is statistically significant. When the president is 
from the privileged region, however, then the support for cash crops rises; the coefficients on the 
respective indicator are positive and significant. And as seen in the last row of columns 1 and 2, 
when the privileged region produces cash crops and the president is from that region, the 
coefficients are again positive and significant.
12 
In columns 3 to 6, we explore the correlates of the respective components of the CFBI 
index. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the nominal rate of assistance for cash 
crops, while in columns 5 and 6 it is the nominal rate of assistance for food crops. For each 
dependent variable, we report estimates based on OLS and GMM models, the latter to enable us 
to control for the impact of hysteresis in policy choice. 
The coefficients in columns 3 to 6 reconfirm that the politics surrounding cash crops 
differ from those surrounding food crops. For food crops (columns 5 and 6), the larger the share 
                                                 
10 Following the rapid rise of cocoa and coffee prices in the 1970s, Houphouet Boigny did launch a series of efforts 
to promote the fortunes of the north. Subsequent events suggest that the wisdom of these efforts, as the diverging 
fortunes of the two regions exacerbated political tensions in Cote d’Ivoire. 
11 See the Annex for the specific definition of this “cash-food bias indicator (CFBI).”  
12 The bottom row of table 4 provides the partial derivative of the regression with respect to the dummy variable 
indicating that the president is from a privileged region. The question addressed in the last row is thus whether the 
shift effect of presidential origin differs when there is a privileged cash crop-producing region. 
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of the population in agriculture, the greater the tendency of the governments to intervene in ways 
that lower domestic prices relative to those prevailing in global markets. In addition, 
governments tend to alter this policy when they must secure electoral majorities in order to 
secure power. Neither tendency characterizes the treatment of cash crops, however (columns 3 
and 4). Rather, policies toward cash crops appear to be shaped by the politics of regional 
inequality. In states in which cash crops are grown in “privileged regions,” the government 
intervenes in ways that lower the incomes of farmers. The bias is reversed, however, when the 
President is from that region (as seen in the evaluation of the partial derivative in the last row of 
columns 3 and 4). 
 
Revenue imperative 
 
Policies toward agriculture are also affected by the manner in which governments secure their 
revenues. Governments in Africa have long employed marketing boards and other instruments to 
extract revenues from the exports of cash crops; and they have expended revenues in efforts to 
accommodate the interests of domestic consumers of food crops (Bates 1981, Krueger, Schiff 
and Valdés 1991). 
The coefficients on “cash region” in table 4 are negative and significant in most models 
(columns 1-4). While consistent with a theory of revenue generation, these findings could also 
indicate efforts at regional re-distribution. The coefficients on the “resource rich” dummy 
variable are less ambiguous. They suggest that governments with alternative sources of revenues 
do not differentially tax cash crops (see columns 3 and 4), but tend to favor them relative to food 
crops (columns 1 and 2) by conferring substantial subsidies on the consumers of food (columns 5 
and 6). 
While we might expect governments with additional sources of revenue to reduce the 
pressures they place on agriculture, the results thus suggest the contrary. As seen in columns 3 
and 4, governments from resource rich economies treat export agriculture no differently than do 
those in the coastal economies lacking such resources. And, as seen in columns 5 and 6, they 
adopt policies that loweri the domestic prices for food crops. Governments that are wealthier 
because of presiding over economies abundantly endowed with natural resources are thus not 
inclined to reduce the burdens they place on farmers. Note that our data do not allow us to 
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exclude an interpretation that treats governments as agencies of social welfare. If governments 
seek food security, the data might suggest those that are better endowed – i.e. resource rich – 
spend more on achieving food security. They may therefore confer subsidies on consumers. 
Without knowing the actual instruments employed, and whether they lower or increase the 
profits of farmers while lowering prices for consumers, we cannot discriminate between this 
interpretation and our own. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In this chapter, we have explored patterns of variation in the content of agricultural policies in 
Africa. We have looked at the impact of the government’s need for revenues, the incentives for 
farmers to lobby, and their capacity to affect electoral outcomes. We have also explored the 
political impact of regional inequality, especially insofar as it is generated by cash crop 
production. These factors operate in ways that deepen our appreciation of the political roots of 
agricultural policies. 
  Specifically, the implications we can draw from the above results are as follows: 
•  Policies toward agriculture are often the bi-product of other political concerns, so 
analysts should take into account the broader political setting when addressing 
agricultural policies; 
•  While policy analysts should continue to focus on normative and welfare issues, they 
should pay close attention as well to the incentives faced by policy makers; 
•  Precisely because they shape the incentives faced by politicians, institutions matter; and 
•  The prospects for policy reform are greater in poor democracies than they are in poor 
countries that lack competitive elections. 
 
 
References  
 
     16
Anderson, K. (1995), “Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor 
Countries”, Economic Development and Cultural Change 43(2): 401-23. 
Anderson, K., Y. Hayami and Others (1986), The Political Economy of Agricultural Production: 
East Asia in International Perspective, London: Allen and Unwin.   
Anderson, K., M. Kurzweil, W. Martin, D. Sandri and E. Valenzuela (2008), “Measuring 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives, Revisited”, World Trade Review 7(4): 1-30. 
Anderson, K., and E. Valenzuela (2008), Estimates of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives, 
1955 to 2007, core database at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions. 
Barkan, J.D. (1994), Beyond Capitalism vs Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania, Boulder CO: 
Lynne Rienner. 
Bates, R. (2007a), "Domestic Interests and Control Regimes", pp. 175-201 in B. Ndulu, P. 
Collier, R. Bates and S. O'Connell (eds.), The Political Economy of Economic Growth in 
Africa, 1960-2000, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Bates, R. (2007b), "Political Reform", pp. 348-390 in B. Ndulu, P. Collier, R. H. Bates and S. 
O'Connell (eds.), The Political Economy of African Economic Growth, 1960-2000, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
Bates, R.H. (1981), Markets and States in Tropical Africa, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press.   
Bates, R.H. (1989), Beyond the Miracle of the Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bates, R.H. and W.P. Rogerson (1980), "Agriculture in Development: A Coalitional Analysis", 
Public Choice 35(5): 513-28.   
Beck, T., G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer, and P. Walsh (2001), "New Tools in Comparative 
Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions", World Bank Economic Review 
15: 165-176.  
Beck, T., P.E. Keefer and G.R. Clarke (2008), Database of Political Institutions, accessible at 
http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40 
Blundell, R. and S. Bond (1998), “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel 
Data Models”, Journal of Econometrics 87: 115-43. 
Chenery, H.B. and L.J. Taylor (1968), "Development Patterns: Among Countries and Over 
Time", Review of Economics and Statistics 50(4): 391-416.  
     17
Ferree, K. and S. Singh (2002), "Political Institutions and Economic Growth in Africa: 1970-
1995", in Coping with Globalization: Cross-National Patterns in Domestic Governance 
and Policy, edited by S. Chan and J. Scarritt, Boulder: Frank Cass. 
Krueger, A.O., M. Schiff and A. Valdés (eds.) (1991), The Political Economy of Agricultural 
Pricing Policy, Volume 1: Latin America, Volume 2: Asia, and Volume 3: Africa and the 
Mediterranean, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank.   
Kuznets, S. (1966), Modern Economic Growth, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
Lindert, P. (1991), "Historical Patterns of Agricultural Policy", pp. 29-83 in P. Timmer (ed.),  
Agriculture and the State, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   
Ndulu, B., P. Collier, R. Bates and S. O'Connell (eds.) (2007), The Political Economy of 
Economic Growth in Africa, 1960-2000, 2 volumes, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Ndulu, B.J. and S.A. O'Connell (2007), "Policy Plus: African Growth Performance 1960-2000", 
pp. 3-75 in B.J. Ndulu, P. Collier, R.H. Bates and S. O'Connell (eds.), The Political 
Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960-2000, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Nordhaus, W. (2006), The G-Econ Database on Gridded Output: Methods and Data, Yale 
University, New Haven. http://gecon.yale.edu/gecon_data_%20051206.pdf  
Olson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
Varshney, A. (1995), Democracy, Development and the Countryside, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
World Bank (2007), World Development Indicators 2007, Washington DC: World Bank. 
 
     18
Annex:  Policy indicators and other variables used 
 
The principal indicators of trade interventions that we examine in this chapter draw on the World 
Bank’s new Database of Agricultural Distortions (see Anderson and Valenzuela 2008 and, for 
the methodology behind it, Anderson et al. 2008). We propose models to explain agricultural 
distortions as indicated by nominal rates of assistance to agricultural tradables relative to non-
agricultural tradables (the relative rate of assistance), as well as the nominal rates of assistance to 
agricultural importables and agricultural exportables (and the ratio derived from them, known as 
the Trade Bias Index).  
  For each commodity aggregates (x), the nominal rate of assistance when an ad valorem 
tariff is the sole intervention is calculated as: 
m
m t
P E
P E t P E
x NRA =
×
× − + ×
=
) 1 (
_ ) 1 (  
tm  is tariff rate, E is the nominal exchange rate, and P is the dollar-denominated world price of 
the commodity. Anderson et al. (2008) provide a detailed discussion of how this basic formula is 
modified to incorporate additional distortions, such as taxes and subsidies on domestic 
production of the relevant commodities. 
  We also examine key ratios among these indicators. The relative rate of assistance 
captures the relative support given to agricultural versus non-agricultural tradables: 
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Thus, when agriculture is relatively favored (disfavored) by trade interventions in agriculture 
versus non-agriculture, the RRA is greater (less) than zero.  Similarly, Anderson et al. (2008) 
provide an indicator of trade bias within agriculture, by comparing the relative assistance to 
exportables versus importables (the trade bias index): 
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The TBI is negative when interventions are relatively unfavorable to agricultural exportables 
(interpreted as a anti-trade bias). 
     19
  Our analysis also makes reference to nominal rates of assistance to food crops and cash 
crops. To construct these aggregates, we use the nominal rates of assistance calculated by the 
World Bank data set, weighting within each category by the share in the value of production of 
each commodity within that category. Our food crop aggregate includes cassava, maize, millet, 
tubers, sorghum, wheat, rice, and yams. Our cash crop aggregate includes cotton, cocoa, coffee, 
nuts, sugar, tobacco, and tea. Analogous to the TBI, we calculate a “cash-food bias index” 
(CFBI): 
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
+
+
= 1
1
1
) 4 (
ps NRAfoodcro
ps NRAcashcro
CFBI  
As in the previous cases, this indicator is greater (less) than zero when cash crops are favored 
(disfavored) relative to food crops by trade policy interventions. 
  The various variables used in our analysis and their sources are as follows: 
 
Variable Units  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Source     
NRA  Prop’n    Anderson and Valenzuela (2008)     
___agricultural tradables    -0.148 0.275          
___non-ag tradables    0.148 0.160          
___agricultural importables  0.073 0.412          
___agricultural exportables -0.255 0.280          
___foodcrops   -0.048 0.294          
___cashcrops   -0.288 0.339          
RRA  Prop’n  -0.198 0.276   Anderson and Valenzuela (2008)     
Anti-trade bias  Prop’n  -0.226 0.370   Anderson and Valenzuela (2008)     
Competitive   0/1  0.317 0.466   Ferree and Singh (2002)   
elections      Beck et al. (2001, 2008).    
Rural population share  Prop’n  0.756 0.126   World Bank (2007) 
Log real GDP per capita 
(constant 2000 US dollars) 
  7.090 0.610   World Bank (2007) 
Landlocked  0/1  0.362 0.481   Ndulu et al. (2007)   
Coastal  0/1  0.538 0.499   Ndulu et al. (2007)   
Resource rich  0/1  0.176 0.381   Ndulu and O'Connell (2007)   
Arable land share  Prop’n  0.11 0.092   World Bank (2007) 
Cashcrop privileged region  0/1  0.723 0.448   Bates (2007)     
President from   0/1  0.465 0.500   Bates (2007)     
     privileged region                 
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Figure 1: Trade Bias Index, Africa’s resource rich, landlocked and coastal countries, 1955 to 
2005 
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Source: Based on national TBI estimates in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).
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Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to food and cash crops, Africa’s resource rich, 
landlocked and coastal countries, 1955 to 2005 
(a) Food crops 
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Figure 2 (continued): Nominal rates of assistance to food and cash crops, Africa’s resource rich, 
landlocked and coastal countries, 1955 to 2005 
 
(b) Cash crops 
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Source: Based on national NRA estimates in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).
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Figure 3: Relative rates of assistance to agricultural vs non-agricultural tradables, Africa’s 
resource rich, landlocked and coastal countries, 1955 to 2005 
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Source: Based on national RRA estimates in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).
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Figure 4: Relative rates of assistance and agricultural trade bias indexes, Africa, 1970 to 2005 
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Source: Based on national RRA and TBI estimates in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
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Figure 5: Index of Electoral Party Competition, Africa, 1970 to 2005 
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Figure 6: Relative rates of assistance by rural population share, Africa, 1970-2004 
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Source: Authors’ analysis, based on national RRA estimates in Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2008). 
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Figure 7: Nominal rates of assistance by rural population share and trade focus, Africa, 1970-
2004 
 
(a) NRA for agricultural importables 
 
 
Semi-Parametric Regression
nra_totm (no elect comp) nra_totm (elect comp)
95 90 85 75 80
Rural pop. share
70  65  60 
.5
.25 NRA Agr. Importables 
0 
-.25
-.5 
 
     28
Figure 7 (continued): Nominal rates of assistance by rural population share and trade focus, 
Africa, 1970-2004 
 
(b) NRA for agricultural exportables 
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on national NRA estimates in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008). 
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Table 1: Determinants of Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA), 1975 to 2004 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS RE
a SYS-GMM
b OLS        
Rural pop. share  -0.0002  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.003) 
Elecomp dummy  0.072  -0.414  -0.547  -0.475 
 (0.052)  (0.298)  (0.268)**  (0.162)** 
Log Real GDP per 
cap 
0.068 0.075  0.075  0.041 
 (0.070)  (0.073)  (0.065)  (0.040) 
Landlocked dummy  -0.263  -0.278  -0.285  -0.163 
 (0.118)**  (0.121)**  (0.120)**  (0.067)** 
Resource rich 
dummy 
0.130 0.142  0.156  0.094 
 (0.098)  (0.102)  (0.105)  (0.062) 
Arable land share of 
total 
0.017 0.017  0.017  0.008 
 (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.002)*** 
Elecomp x rural pop 
shr 
 0.007  0.009  0.007 
   (0.005)  (0.004)**  (0.003)** 
RRA (t-1)        0.467 
       (0.107)*** 
Constant -0.934  -0.781  -0.737  -0.297 
 (0.861)  (0.864)  (0.799)  (0.443) 
Observations 375  375  375  373 
R-squared 0.52  0.53 0.53  
        
Total Effect of:        
Rural pop. Share w/ 
comp. elections 
 0.004  0.006  0.005 
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.003)
† 
        
Comp. election, w/ 
rural pop shr = 50% 
 -0.063  -0.100  -0.142 
 (0.086)  (0.069)  (0.041)*** 
        
Comp. election, w/ 
rural pop shr = 85% 
 0.182 
(0.105)* 
0.213 
(0.103)** 
0.090 
(0.063) 
Robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
† P = 0.113   
a Random effects model 
b One-step system GMM   
Year Dummies not reported. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table 2: Determinants of Nominal Rate of Assistance for Agricultural Importables, 1975 to 2004 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS OLS RE SYS-GMM        
Rural pop. share  -0.016  -0.019  -0.017  -0.007 
 (0.006)**  (0.007)**  (0.013)  (0.003)** 
Elecomp dummy  0.198  -0.335  -0.438  -0.217 
 (0.058)***  (0.541)  (0.560)  (0.277) 
Log Real GDP per 
cap 
-0.141 -0.133  -0.151  -0.054 
 (0.100)  (0.105)  (0.121)  (0.038) 
Landlocked dummy  -0.071  -0.086  -0.103  -0.032 
 (0.123)  (0.128)  (0.166)  (0.055) 
Resource rich 
dummy 
-0.440 -0.426  -0.325  -0.120 
 (0.116)***  (0.116)***  (0.184)*  (0.035)*** 
Arable land share of 
total 
0.034 
 
0.034 0.027 0.008 
 (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.004)***  (0.002)*** 
Elecomp x rural pop 
shr 
 0.008  0.009  0.004 
   (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.004) 
NRA_agimpt (t-1)        0.675 
       (0.087)*** 
Constant 2.102  2.269  2.285  0.834 
 (1.096)*  (1.137)*  (1.736)  (0.428)* 
Observations 375  375  375  374 
R-squared 0.42  0.43 0.42  
        
Total effect of:        
Rural pop. Share w/ 
comp. elections 
 -0.011  -0.008  -0.003 
 (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.003) 
        
Comp. election, w/ 
rural pop shr = 50% 
 0.049  0.035  -0.0001 
 (0.149)  (0.151)  (0.074) 
        
Comp. election, w/ 
rural pop shr = 85% 
 0.319  0.367  0.152 
 (0.148)**  (0.163)**  (0.077)* 
Robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
a Random effects model 
b One-step system GMM   
Year Dummies not reported. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
    
 
31
 
Table 3: Determinants of Nominal Rate of Assistance to Agricultural Exportables, 1975 to 2004 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS  OLS  RE  SYS-GMM 
Rural pop. share  0.007  0.006  -0.002  0.007 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) 
Elecomp dummy  0.091  -0.092  -0.414  -0.109 
  (0.059) (0.411) (0.392) (0.334) 
Log Real GDP per 
cap 
0.270 0.273 0.227 0.268 
  (0.085)*** (0.089)*** (0.094)**  (0.066)*** 
Landlocked 
dummy 
-0.175 -0.181 -0.159 -0.178 
  (0.087)* (0.090)* (0.094)* (0.076)** 
Resource rich 
dummy 
0.116 0.121 0.005 0.142 
  (0.113) (0.117) (0.151) (0.118) 
Arable land share 
of total 
0.004 0.004 0.011 0.002 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Elecomp x rural 
pop shr 
 0.003  0.007  0.003 
   (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
NRA_agexpt  (t-1)     0.115 
     (0.092) 
Constant  -2.937 -2.879 -1.980 -2.714 
  (0.959)*** (0.939)*** (1.205)  (0.627)*** 
Observations  375 375 375 374 
R-squared  0.48 0.48 0.44  
      
Total Effect of:      
Rural pop. Share 
w/ comp. elections 
 0.008  0.005  0.009 
 (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.005)
† 
      
Comp. election, w/ 
rural pop shr = 
50% 
 0.040  -0.073  0.023 
 (0.135)  (0.129)  (0.103) 
      
Comp. election, w/ 
rural pop shr = 
85% 
 0.133  0.165  0.116 
 (0.098)  (0.099)*  (0.090) 
Robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses. 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
† P = 0.113   
a Random effects model 
b One-step system GMM.    Year Dummies not reported.       Source: Authors’ calculations     32
Table 4: The Role of a Privileged Cash Crop Region and Presidential Origin on Protection of 
Cash versus Food Crop Protection, 1975 to 2004 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Dep Var:  CFBI Dep Var:  
NRA_cashcrops
Dep Var:  
NRA_foodcrops
 
   
 OLS  SYS-
GMM 
OLS SYS-
GMM 
OLS SYS-
GMM 
Cash  region  -0.255 -0.096 -0.218 -0.047 -0.021 -0.014 
 (0.137)*  (0.058)  (0.078)** (0.023)*  (0.078)  (0.043) 
Pres. from 
privlg region 
0.289 0.143 0.133 0.163 -0.087  0.008 
(0.159)* (0.069)* (0.110)  (0.029)*** (0.149)  (0.089) 
Cash x pres 
from privlg. 
-0.029 -0.025 -0.013 -0.126 0.085  -0.004 
(0.158) (0.072) (0.118) (0.030)***  (0.204) (0.122) 
Rural pop. 
share 
0.034 0.013 0.010 0.003 -0.019  -0.011 
(0.011)** (0.006)** (0.007)  (0.002)* (0.006)***  (0.003)*** 
Comp. 
elections 
-0.078 -0.066 0.040  0.002  0.111  0.081 
(0.074) (0.041) (0.074) (0.025) (0.039)**  (0.020)*** 
Log real GDP 
per cap. 
0.377 0.146 0.116 0.024 -0.222  -0.134 
(0.206)* (0.078)* (0.156)  (0.035) (0.074)**  (0.047)** 
Landlocked 
dummy 
-0.048 0.002  -0.088 -0.016 -0.051 -0.039 
(0.157) (0.063) (0.121) (0.026) (0.103) (0.056) 
Resource-rich 
dummy 
0.571 0.229 0.021 -0.012  -0.491  -0.297 
(0.153)*** (0.087)**  (0.073)  (0.018) (0.121)***  (0.057)*** 
Arable land 
shr of total 
-0.026 -0.010 -0.000 0.001  0.026  0.015 
(0.005)*** (0.004)**  (0.003)  (0.001) (0.006)***  (0.002)*** 
        
Lagged dep. 
var. 
  0.570   0.727   0.398 
  (0.054)***   (0.062)***   (0.059)*** 
Constant  -5.414 -1.970 -1.981 -0.445 2.838  1.533 
 (2.081)**  (0.809)**  (1.498)  (0.311) (0.866)***  (0.478)*** 
Observations  249 247 249 248 249 247 
R-squared  0.43   0.30   0.35   
Total effect of:        
        
Pres from prv 
if there is cash 
prv reg. 
0.260 0.118 0.120 0.038 -0.001  0.003 
(0.110)** (0.045)** (0.083)  (0.020)*  (0.096)  (0.050) 
 
Robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
Year dummies not reported.   
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
   